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CHARLES THELEN PLOMBECK*

Confidentiality and Disclosure:
The Money Laundering Control Act
of 1986 and Banking Secrecy
"Banking secrecy" means that financial institutions must keep information received about their clients in the course of business secret and
confidential. In the United States a variety of legal doctrines, grounded
in contract,' agency, 2 and tort 3 theory, recognize and protect the interest
of individuals in financial privacy. 4 Some of these rights are codified in
the Right to Financial Privacy Act, which protects individual financial
5
privacy rights from interference by the state.
Records of financial transactions are highly useful in ascertaining physical transactions, and are often the only evidence of their occurrence.
Moreover, the financial proceeds of crime usually find their way to those
who commissioned the crime. Many financial transactions, because of
*A.B. 1983, J.D. 1986, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Associate, Trenam,
Simmons, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye & O'Neill, Tampa and Miami, Florida.
I. An English case, Tournier v. National Provincial & Union Bank of England, [1924]
I K.B. 421 (C.A. 1923) is credited with establishing the common-law principle that a banker
owes an implied contractual duty of confidentiality to his customer. Compendium, Bank
Secrecy, FinancialPrivacy, and Related Restrictions, 2 INT'L Bus. LAW. 281 (1979). Tournier
lists four qualifications to this duty: (a) when disclosures are compelled by law; (b) when
there is a duty to the public to disclose; (c) when the interest of the bank requires disclosure;
(d) when the disclosure is made with the express or implied consent of the customer.
2. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961) included agency
as a legal basis for asserting a duty of confidentiality on the part of a bank. Grainy Dev.
Corp. v. Taksen, 400 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Ct. App.), aff'd, 411 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1978), refined the
agency concept that an agent is subject to a duty to his principal not to use or communicate
confidential information given to him by his principal or acquired by him during the course
of or on account of his agency.
3. The tort theories of invasion of privacy and defamation, though containing fundamental deficiencies, may provide some protection of financial privacy. See L. FIsCHER, THE
LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY
5.04 (1983).
4. "The banking transactions of an individual give a fairly accurate account of his
religion, ideology, opinion, and interest ..
" California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S.
21, 85 (1974) (Statement of Justice William 0. Douglas).
5. Title XI of the Financial Regulatory Interest Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95630, 92 Stat. 3641.
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bookkeeping entries, required records, or the instruments themselves,
reveal the identities of the payor and the payee, leaving a ready "audit
trail." Criminals conceal this evidence from law enforcement authorities
by "laundering" their funds through financial institutions, 6 allowing criminals to fund other legal or illegal ventures. 7 Consequently, the interest
of individuals in financial privacy competes with the interest of government in requiring disclosure of financial information to assist in law
enforcement.
This competition between individual and law enforcement interests has
8
spawned three major pieces of federal legislation. The Bank Secrecy Act,
enacted in 1970, imposes recordkeeping and reporting requirements on
financial institutions in order to supply law enforcement with evidence of
financial transactions. 9 The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, enacted in response to the Supreme Court's decision to allow the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act to override the protections of the fourth
amendment in United States v. Miller, 10 protects the rights of individuals
to financial privacy. The Money, Laundering Control Act of 1986 (the
Act), I enacted to prevent parts of the Bank Secrecy Act from being
circumvented by money launderers, supplements the Bank Secrecy Act
and the Right to Financial Privacy Act, and creates new substantive criminal offenses for money laundering.
6. Money laundering is a process whereby one conceals the existence, illegal source,
or illegal application of income, and then disguises that income to make it appear legitimate.
See COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING (1984). Illegal enterprises frequently
employ money laundering as a vital link in criminal operations. S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 43 (1986) [hereinafter SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT]. Complex schemes are devised
to conceal the true source of income and disguise its illegal nature. Id. at 28.
7.H.R. REP. No. 855, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 8 (1986) [hereinafter HousE JUDICIARY REPORT].

8. Amendments to Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. II 14
(1970).
9. The disclosure requirements may be imposed upon financial institutions because they
constitute a regulated industry, deriving their charter to operate from state and national
government. California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), upheld the validity
of imposing reporting requirements on financial institutions.
10. 425 U.S. 435 (1976); see infra note 170.
II. Subtitle H of Title I of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100
Stat. 3207 (introduced Sept. 8, 1986 as H.R. 5484) (codified as amended in scattered sections

of 18 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.). See 132 CoNG. REC. H6739 (Sept. 1I, 1986) (passage in House);
132 CONG. REC. S14302 (Sept. 30, 1986) (passage in Senate). Earlier bills were proposed
by Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-N.Y.), S. 571, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), and S. 2306.
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
The Act is a part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which addresses the problem of drug abuse
with a battery of legislation. Various provisions of the Act define new crimes, increase
penalties and enforcement authority, attempt to control the international supply of narcotics,
enhance the ability of the government to interdict narcotics trafficking, and strive to reduce
the demand for narcotics in schools, among federal employees, and in national parks.
VOL. 22, NO. I
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I. New Offenses
Prior to the passage of the Act, the Bank Secrecy Act dealt with the
problem of money laundering only indirectly by requiring the filing of
various reports and punishing the failure to do so. The Act approaches
the problem of money laundering directly by proscribing certain types of
transactions commonly used to launder funds derived from illegal activity.
The Act creates two new federal crimes of money laundering, which may
be referred to as the "Money Laundering Crime" and the "Monetary
Transactions Crime."
A.

THE MONEY LAUNDERING CRIME

The Money Laundering Crime involves activities that the drafters considered "the core of money laundering" 12 namely (I) promoting "specified unlawful activity," 13 a term of art used to describe crimes commonly
associated with narcotics trafficking, financial misconduct, and organized
crime; (2) designing transactions or transporting monetary instruments to
conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership,
or the control of the proceeds of "specified unlawful activity";14 and (3)
avoiding transaction reporting requirements under state or federal law. 15
To reach these activities, the Act prohibits certain specific financial transactions (thc "Transaction Offense") 16 and certain transportation activities (the "Transportation Offense").17
1.Scienter

Scienter standards under the Money Laundering Crime require a high
degree of proof of the defendant's specific intent or knowledge of the
underlying activity. As with other white collar crimes, the focus of most
money laundering cases will be on scienter, rather than on the prohibited
acts themselves (as is the focus of most drug offenses, where scienter is
implied from the natural consequences of one's prohibited acts).
To be guilty of either of the Money Laundering Crime's two component
offenses, the Transaction Offense and the Transportation Offense, the
defendant must have conducted the prohibited acts either:
12. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 36.
13. "Specified unlawful activity" is discussed infra text accompanying note 35.
14. The language is intended to include transactions designed to conceal the identity of
the participants to a transaction, when it can also be proved that the funds involved in the
transaction are in fact the proceeds of crime. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at
36.
15. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
16. Id.
17. Id.
SPRING 1988

72

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

(A) having the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity; or
(B) knowing that the transaction or transportation' 8 is designed in
whole or in part
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under state or
federal law. 19
The scienter standards of both the Transaction Offense and the Transportation Offense may be summarized as "intent to promote" or
"knowing."
The "intent to promote" standard adopted by the Act apparently is a
higher standard than "intent to facilitate," the standard initially proposed
by the Senate Judiciary Committee. "Facilitate" has been interpreted in
some contexts as meaning "to make easy or less difficult," 20 whereas
"promote" has been defined as "to contribute to the growth, enlargement,
or propensity of, to further encourage, to bring or help to bring (as a
business enterprise) into being." 2' While the word "promote" may connote more concrete or positive action than "facilitate," the legislative
history provides no guidance as to the possible distinctions between the
two forms. The Senate Judiciary Report indicates that the "intent to
facilitate" language was intended to encompass situations similar to those
prosecuted under the federal aiding and abetting statute. 22 Thus, in interpreting the intent to promote standard, the aiding and abetting cases
in'which the facts do not demonstrate concretely positive action may
prove inapposite.
"Knowing," as currently interpreted, 23 is a high scienter standard. The
legislative history makes it clear that negligent involvement in a money

18. The Transportation Offense contains an additional scienter requirement that the defendant know that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transportation represent
the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. Id. § 1956(a)(2)(B).
19. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a) (West Supp. 1987).
20. United States v. Judkins, 428 F.2d 333, 335 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Miller,
379 F.2d 483, 486 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Barrow, 212 F. Supp. 837, 840 (E.D. Pa.
1962).
21. Ricci v. United States, 507 F.2d 1390, 1398 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabr. ed. 1971)).
22. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1986); see, e.g., Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635
(4th Cir. 1940) (guilt as an accessory depends on aiding and assisting the perpetrators, those
who make a profit by furnishing to criminals the means to carry on undertakings as though
actual partners having a stake in the enterprise).
23. United States v. Hernando Ospina, 798 F.2d 1570, 1580 (11 th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Heyman, 794 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1986).
VOL. 22, NO. I
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laundering scheme is not punishable. 24 However, "willful blindness"such as intentional and knowing disregard of the nature of the funds
involved-is punishable. 25 Conducting a legitimate and ordinary transaction with the mere suspicion that it may be part of a laundering activity
or that the funds are proceeds of a crime is not proscribed. By way of
contrast, particular knowledge of a fact or circumstance surrounding the
transaction may satisfy the scienter requirements if the fact or circumstance clearly indicates the illegal nature of the transaction. Because of

the high scienter standards of the offenses, business people can have some
assurance that they are not likely to face prosecution merely because the
transaction was suspect in nature, unless they have some specific knowledge of their acts and omissions which would amount to "willful blindness."
A defendant must know that the transaction or transportation is designed either (1)
to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source,
the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,
or (2) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under state or federal
law. 26 The defendant must also know that the monetary instrument or
funds involved in the transportation represent the proceeds of some form
of unlawful activity. 27 The defendant need not know that the crime that
generated the funds was "specified unlawful activity," 28 nor even exactly
what crime generated the funds involved in the transaction, only that the

24. A "reason to know" standard proposed earlier in the history of the Act, by S. 572,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), the Organized Crime Commission's bill, and S. 1385, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), Senator DeConcini's bill, was criticized as being susceptible to the
construction that negligent involvement in a money laundering transaction might be punishable. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 32. A "reckless disregard" standard,
proposed by the Administration bill, S. 1335, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), also was rejected
in favor of the higher "knowing" standard in the Senate Judiciary bill.
25. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 35; see also United States v. Jewel, 532
F.2d 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). Thus, a currency exchanger who
participates in a transaction with a known drug dealer involving hundreds of thousands of
dollars in cash and accepts a commission far above the market rate, could not escape
conviction simply by claiming that he did not know for sure that the currency involved in
the transaction was derived from crime. On the other hand, an automobile dealer who sells
a car at market rate to a person whom he merely suspects has involvement with crime,
cannot be convicted of this offense in the absence of a showing that he knew something
more about the transaction or the circumstances surrounding it.
26. Where intent to promote is not involved. For further clarification of the "knowing"
standard see HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 7, at 13-14.
27. Though this stipulation is not required in a Transportation Offense when intent to
promote is involved.
28. This restriction precludes the allegation that the defendant thought that the property
involved represented the proceeds of a crime not covered within the term "specified unlawful
activity." It was reported to the Senate Judiciary Committee that such a defense had been
successfully raised in other countries whose statutes do not draw the distinction. SENATE
JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 37.
SPRING 1988
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funds are proceeds of some kind of crime that is a felony under federal
29
or state law.

2. ProhibitedActs

Presumably to prevent easy evasion, the acts prohibited by the Transaction Offense and the Transportation Offense are extremely broad. Because few limiting principles emerge from the prohibited acts themselves,

the scienter and jurisdictional requirements are the primary limitations to
the law's application. The limitations on the prohibited acts themselves
are principally in the definitions of the terms "financial transaction,"
"proceeds of specified unlawful activity," and "monetary instrument or
funds."

a. Transacting
Fundamentally, the Transaction Offense prohibits conducting 30 financial transactions in property 3' that represent the proceeds of specified
unlawful activity. 32 Though the term "transaction" is defined very
broadly, 33 the term "financial transaction" is limited to transactions involving movements of funds by wire or other means, to transactions
involving monetary instruments, and to transactions involving the use of
a financial institution. 34 Though potentially applicable to any commercial

29. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(c)(1) (West Supp. 1987). See infra text accompanying note 28.
30. The term "conducts" is defined to include initiating, concluding, or participating in
initiating or concluding a transaction. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(c)(2) (West Supp. 1987). This
definition ensures that the Transaction Offense applies not only to a person who deposits
cash in a bank knowing that the cash represents the proceeds of crime, but also to a bank
employee who accepts the cash if the employee knows that the money represents the
proceeds of crime. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 38.
31. The Senate Judiciary Report states that the term "property" is intended to be construed liberally to encompass any form of tangible or intangible assets. SENATE JUDICIARY
REPORT, supra note 6, at 39. The term "involved" as used in the phrase "property involved
in a financial transaction" is not defined.
32. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(b) (West Supp. 1987).
33. The term includes various activities involving financial institutions, such as a deposit,
a withdrawal, an exchange of currency, a transfer between accounts, and the purchase or
sale of certificates of deposit. Id. § 1956(c)(3). The term also includes a loan, extension of
credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond, or other monetary instrument, or any other
payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution, by whatever means
effected. Id. The term also includes activities not involving banks, such as the purchase,
sale or other disposition of property of all kinds. "Transaction" also includes any loan,
pledge, gift, transfer, or delivery. Id. Thus a lawyer who deposits funds or exchanges stock
in the course of creating a dummy corporation for the purchase or sale of property, or aids
in the sale of property, knowing that such actions are part of someone's scheme to conceal
the proceeds of a crime could be charged with money laundering. HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT,
supra note 7, at 15.
34. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(c)(4) (West Supp. 1987). For the definition of "monetary instrument," see infra text accompanying note 43.
VOL. 22, NO. I
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activity, transactions in property that are not monetary instruments or
funds and that do not involve financial institutions may escape the proscriptions of the Transaction Offense.
"Specified unlawful activity" is central to the Transaction Offense and
is perhaps the most significant limitation to its application. "Specified
unlawful activity" defines the particular crimes from which the property
involved in the transaction must derive. 35 The Transaction Offense requires that the property involved in a transaction must in fact be proceeds
of "specified unlawful activity," and that the defendant must intend to
promote "specified unlawful activity" or know that the transaction is
designed either to conceal or disguise proceeds of "specified unlawful
activity" or to avoid a reporting requirement. The requirement that the
property in fact be derived from specified unlawful activity is important
because the elements of the particular specified unlawful activity become
essential elements of the Transaction Offense to be proved by the
prosecution.
"Specified unlawful activity" is defined by reference to several federal
statutes. The crimes encompassed in the term are those crimes most
commonly associated with organized crime, drug trafficking, and financial
misconduct. Crimes associated with organized crime and drug trafficking
include continuing criminal enterprise offenses 36 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) offenses. 37 Crimes associated with financial misconduct include such crimes as embezzlement,
bank bribery, and illegal arms sales. 38 Bank Secrecy Act offenses are not
included as a "specified unlawful activity" on the theory that there are
of Bank Secrecy Act violations as there are
no identifiable "proceeds"
39
for RICO offenses.

35. The crimes comprising "specified unlawful activity" are detailed in new § 1956(a)(7).
This section attempts to strike a balance between the Organized Crime Commission bill and
the Administration bill by covering the proceeds of federal financial offenses and foreign
drug offenses as well as RICO offenses. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 36.
36. Covered under 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West Supp. 1986) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(c)(7)(C)
(West Supp. 1987).
37. Listed in 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(e) (West Supp. 1987) or in id. § 1956(c)(7)(A).
38. 22 U.S.C.A. 2778 (West Supp. 1986) (embezzlement); 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2401 (West
Supp. 1986) (bank bribery); 50 U.S.C.A. § 1702 (West Supp. 1986); 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 3
(West Supp. 1986).
39. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(c)(7)(A) (1987); see also

SENATE

JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note

6, at 39. The Senate Judiciary Committee viewed violations of the reporting requirements
of the Bank Secrecy Act as more appropriately covered by inclusion directly in the operative
language of both the Transaction Offense and the Transportation Offense. Because the Act
states that nothing contained therein supersedes any provision of state or federal law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to those provided for in the
Act, a person can be charged with both violation of the Act and violation of the Bank
Secrecy Act for causing a financial institution to fail to fill out the proper forms or fill them
out improperly. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 40.
SPRING 1988
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b. Transporting
The Transportation Offense applies to actions in which money is laundered by transferring it into or out of the United States. 40 The Transportation Offense prohibits the act of transporting or attempting to transport
a monetary instrument or funds, either with intent to promote a crime or
with knowledge that the transportation is designed to conceal a crime. 4 1
Many transactions prohibited by this offense could also be punishable as
financial transactions under the Transaction Offense. Thus the Transportation Offense is essential to reach activities that avoid being financial
transactions or financial transactions that are conducted outside the United
States.
The term "transportation" is not defined. 4 2 Thus the most significant
limitation to the statute's application is that the transportation must involve a "monetary instrument" or "funds." The term "monetary instrument" is defined to include coin or currency4 3 of the United States or of
any other country, travelers' checks, personal checks, bank checks, money
orders, investment securities in bearer form or other forms in which title
passes upon delivery, and negotiable instruments in bearer form or other
form in which title passes upon delivery. The definition would include

40. Even prior to the Act, when cash was transported out of the country, the IRS had
the authority to seize the cash because customs regulations had been violated. Prior to
amendment, however, if the cash transaction occurred in the U.S., and the cash was then
wired to other countries, the restrictive provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act made it virtually
impossible for the IRS to seize the cash. See Hanlon, Senate Banking Committee Continues
Hearings on Money Laundering Bills, 31 TAX NOTES 446 (1986). The offense supports
recent efforts by the United States to obtain international cooperation to halt the flow of
drug money, and to prevent the United States from becoming a haven in which foreign drug
traffickers can keep or invest their earnings. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at
37. See discussion of international attempts to halt the flow of drug money in H. R. REP.
No. 746, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter HOUSE BANKING REPORT].
41. The knowledge requirement of this section should also be construed to encompass
instances of "willful blindness"; the "intent to promote" language should also be construed
in accord with Backun v. United States 112 F.2d 635 (4th Cir. 1940). SENATE JUDICIARY
REPORT, supra note 6, at 37. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26. This section is not
triggered by mere receipt of property or by the recipient's mere "belief" that the property
represented the proceeds of crime.
42. See H.R. REP. No. 984, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, 4 (1984) (addition of "about to
transport" language); United States v. Gomez-Londono, 442 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
rev'd on other grounds, 553 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1977) (confusing "time of departure" with
"transports").
43. The phrase "coin or currency" is intended to include gold or other precious metal
coins, which are the legal tender of a country but which do not normally circulate as such,
or whose value is determined by the worth of their metallic content rather than by the
operation of normal currency exchange markets. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note
6, at 39.
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44 "Monetary instruments"
cashier checks.
are a subset of the term
"property." 45

3. Jurisdiction
The provisions of the Money Laundering Crime are designed to exercise
the full extent of Congress's powers under the commerce clause of the
U.S. Constitution. 46 Conscious of the controversy surrounding United
States extraterritorial enforcement efforts, however, the Act self-imposes
limits to extraterritorial application. First, the Act's extraterritorial jurisdiction applies only to transactions or series of related transactions involving more than $10,000. 4 7 Second, the Act applies only to situations
in which the interests of the United States are involved, either because
the defendant is a U.S. citizen or because the transaction occurred in
48
whole or in part in the United States.
The first limitation may be the only concrete limitation of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. The limits of extraterritorial enforcement of United States
criminal laws are not well defined in the law, 49 and the limitations on the
application of the Money Laundering Crime offer only a small measure
of certainty. International law recognizes three fundamental bases of ex44. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(c)(7)(A) (West Supp. 1987); see also SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT,
supra note 6,at 39; 51 Fed. Reg. 30233 (1986) (proposed rules); 52 Fed. Reg. 11436 (1987)
(final rules on definition of "monetary instruments").
45. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 39; see supra text accompanying note
31.
46. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 39. As described in the legislative history,
the use of the proceeds of unlawful activity to purchase a residence would be covered if
any of the materials used in the construction of the house could be shown to have come
from out of state. The transactions must involve "interstate or foreign commerce" or be
conducted by or through a financial institution, as defined in 31 U.S.C.A. § 5312(a)(2) (West
Supp. 1986) and regulations. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(c)(6) (West Supp. 1987); see 52 Fed. Reg.
11436 (1987) (revising definitions of "bank" and "financial institution"); see also United
States v. Penagaricano-Soler, 646 F. Supp. 75 (D.P.R. 1986) (discussing the term "financial
institution"). The financial institution must be engaged in, or its activities must affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, "in any way or degree." 18 U.S.C.A. 1956(c)(4) (West Supp.
1987). The term "affect commerce in any way or degree" is derived from the Hobbs Act,
18 U.S.C.A. § 1951 (West Supp. 1986).
47. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(f)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
48. Id. § 1956(f)(1); see also SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 40. An example
of the latter is a situation in which a person transfers by wire the proceeds of a drug
transaction from a bank in the United States to a bank in a foreign country. Another example
is a situation in which a person telephones instructions from the United States to one foreign
bank to transfer such proceeds to another foreign bank. Id. The Senate Judiciary Committee
did not intend to impose a duty on foreign citizens operating wholly outside of the United
States to become aware of U.S. laws.
49. See Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Dam, Economic and Political Aspects of Extraterritoriality, 19 INT'L LAW. 887 (1985);
Rosenthal, Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Sovereign Nations, 19 INT'L LAW. 487 (1985).
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traterritorial jurisdiction: (I) jurisdiction based on territoriality, (2) jurisdiction based on nationality, and (3) jurisdiction based on the effects
doctrine. 50 Though conduct involving United States citizens is legitimately
subject to jurisdiction, conduct occurring in part in the United States may
be problematic. It is usually not enough that the conduct merely have
some connection to the United States; the assumption ofjurisdiction must
be "reasonable." 5 1 There is no such reasonableness modifier in the statute, and in fact the legislative history indicates that a wire transfer into
or through the United States is sufficient. The Act conceivably could
apply to an extraterritorial money laundering transaction in which a criminal wires money from one country to another, but the wire transfer system
inadvertently routes the funds through the United States. Whether a court
would read a reasonableness requirement into the Act remains to be
52
seen.
4. Penalties
Persons violating the Transaction Offense are to be sentenced to a fine
of not more than $500,000, or twice the value of the property involved
in the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more
than twenty years, or both. 53 The same is true for the Transportation
54
Offense, except that the fine cannot be less than $500,000.
Civil penalties may be imposed on those found to have committed a
Money Laundering Crime. 55 The standard of proof for imposition of such
a penalty is a preponderance of the evidence. 56 The maximum amount of
such a civil penalty is the value of the property involved in the illegal
transaction, or $10,000, whichever is greater. A civil penalty, if imposed,
is payable to the United States. The Act does not create a private civil
remedy under which penalties would be payable to prevailing private
litigants. 57

50. See

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

THE

FOREIGN

RELATIONS

LAW

OF

THE

UNITED

17 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
51. See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(REVISED) § 402 (Tent. Draft No. 6, April 12, 1985) [hereinafter REVISED RESTATEMENT].
52. To determine reasonableness, the Revised Restatement would require balancing of
numerous factors, including: the extent to which the activity has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effects upon and in the regulating state; the connections (such as nationality,
residences, or economic activity) between the regulating state and the persons principally
responsible for the activity to be regulated; the character of the activity to be regulated;
the extent to which such regulation is consistent with traditions of the international system;
and other considerations. REVISED RESTATEMENT § 403(2).
STATES §

53.

18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987).

54. Id. § 1956(a)(2).
55. Id. § 1956(b).
56. Id.
57. SENATE JUDICIARY
VOL. 22, NO. I
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Civil penalties may be imposed in addition to any fine imposed for the
criminal offense. The forfeiture provisions of new chapter 46 of title 18
of the United States Code 5 8 may be applied in addition to civil and criminal
penalties. 59 For payment of a criminal fine and civil penalty, the government may look to assets of the defendant not involved in the offense. 60

B.

THE MONETARY TRANSACTION CRIME

The Monetary Transaction Crime is one of the House Judiciary Committee's contributions to the legislation. Of the new crimes, the Monetary
Transaction Crime has potentially the broadest application. Simply, the
Monetary Transaction Crime prohibits monetary transactions in criminally derived property. "Monetary transaction" is defined as the deposit,
withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce, of funds or a monetary instrument 61 by, through, or to a
63
financial institution. 62 "Criminally derived property" is any property
64
constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense.
The property must in fact have been derived from "specified unlawful
activity" 65 and must have a value of greater than $10,000.66
The scienter requirement for the Monetary Transaction Crime is that
the defendant "knowingly engages" or "attempts to engage" in a prohibited monetary transaction. To be guilty of the offense, the defendant
must know that he is engaging in a monetary transaction and also know
that the property involved is criminally derived. 6 7 The government is not
required to prove that the defendant knew the offense from which the
property was derived was specified unlawful activity, but merely that the
68
defendant knew the offense was a criminal one.

58. See infra text accompanying note 80.
59. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 38. Thus, a person who commits a
Money Laundering Crime by laundering $250,000 might have the commissions earned for
the laundering civilly forfeited, be subject to a fine of another $250,000 if convicted of the
criminal offense, and pay a civil penalty of another $250,000. Id.
60. Id.
61. See supra text accompanying note 43.
62. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(f)(1) (West Supp. 1987). The term "financial institution" is
defined by reference to 31 U.S.C.A. § 5312(a)(2) (West Supp. 1986) and the regulations
thereunder, as may be amended.
63. See supra text accompanying note 31.
64. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(f)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
65. See supra text accompanying note 35.
66. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(a) (West Supp. 1987).
67. See 132 CONG. REC. S16921 (Oct. 17, 1986) (remarks of Senator DeConcini), suggesting that the defendant must also know that the property is derived from specified unlawful
activity.
68. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(c) (West Supp. 1987).
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The potential breadth of application of this crime was recognized in the
early versions of the bill. 69 It is intended to put at risk any person who
does business with a drug trafficker. Certain applications of the Act, for
example to a grocer who is paid for his produce by the proceeds of a
crime, are beyond the legislative intent, but limitations are not expressly
incorporated in the statute. The crime's application to attorneys representing narcotics traffickers was expressly limited in an earlier draft, but
the limitation did not survive enactment. Any limitations on the scope of
this crime must be evolved judicially.
The Monetary Transaction Crime also has the potential to be applied
expansively extraterritorially. The offense must either occur within U.S.
71
70
territorial jurisdiction or the defendant must be a "U.S. person,"
defined to be either a U.S. national, 72 an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, 73 any person within the U.S., 74 a business association
75
composed principally of U.S. nationals or permanent resident aliens,
or a U.S. corporation or a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corporation. 76 The
nationality basis is broader than for the Money Laundering Crime, which
is limited to U.S. citizens. Although broad, the nationality bases of jurisdiction are generally acceptable. The territorial designations may be
applied exceedingly broadly, however it is possible to maintain, as the
United States has, that the effects doctrine is merely an exercise of territorial jurisdiction. 77 Extending the Monetary Transaction Crime to conduct that has effects in the United States, without more, very likely would
be perceived by other nations as overreaching.
The punishment for violation of the Monetary Transaction Crime is a
78
fine under title 18, or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.
The court may impose an alternative fine to the title 18 fine of not more
than twice the amount of the criminally derived property involved in the
79
transaction.
69.
70.
71.
section
72.
73.
74.

See HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 7, at 13.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(d)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
Id. § 1957(d)(2). Within the meaning of id. § 3077, excluding those defined in sub(2)(d).
As defined in 8 U.S.C.A. § I I01(a)(22) (West Supp. 1986).
As defined in id. § I 101(a)(20).
18 U.S.C.A. § 3077(2)(C) (West Supp. 1986).

75. Id. § 3077(2)(E).

76. Id. § 3077(2)(F).
77. See Laker Airways v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
see also Griffin, United States Antitrust Laws, 21 INT'L LAW. 307 (1987); Sennet & Gavil,
Antitrust Jurisdiction, Extraterritorial Conduct and Interest-Balancing, 19 INT'L LAW. 1185

(1985).
78. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987). As with the Money Laundering Crime,
both the Attorney General and the Secretary of State are given investigative jurisdiction.
Id. § 1957(e).
79. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
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FORFEITURE

If the Money Laundering Crime or the Monetary Transaction Crime is
committed, the money launderer's gross receipts, and property traceable

to such receipts, are subject to civil forfeiture.80 Coin or currency 8' or
any interest in other property8 2 traceable to the coin or currency involved
in a transaction 83 in violation of certain Bank Secrecy Act reporting
requirements8 4 is similarly subject to forfeiture. 85 If the owner or lienholder of such property can establish that he did not act affirmatively, by
act or omission, to violate the Money Laundering Crime, Monetary Transaction Crime, or Bank Secrecy Act provisions, and that the violations
were committed without his knowledge, 86 his property may be spared
87
from forfeiture.
To deter the laundering of foreign crime proceeds in the United States,
the proceeds of an offense against a foreign nation are also forfeitable. 88
Not all foreign offenses are covered, only those involving the manufacture,
importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance, 89 and which
are punishable by death or imprisonment of more than one year both in
the foreign country and in the U.S. 90 The forfeited receipts of a money
launderer 9' and proceeds of an offense against a foreign nation 92 may be
transferred to federal, state or local authorities, 93 or to foreign countries 94

80. Id. § 981(a)(1)(A). By use of the word "receipts" the Senate Judiciary Report
contemplated that only the commission earned by the money launderer would be subject
to forfeiture, and not the laundered corpus itself. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note
6, at 49.
81. Or other monetary instruments to be defined by Regulations.
82. Including any deposit in a financial institution.
83. Or attempted transaction.
84. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5313(a), 5324 (West Supp. 1987). The Senate bill required that the
owner know that the property was involved in the transaction.
85. To the United States, 18 U.S.C.A. § 981(a)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1987), provided that
the property is owned by a regulated bank or brokerage firm, which is protected when
innocently acquiring the property. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 49. Puzzlingly, this section provides no forfeiture if the violation is by a regulated domestic financial
institution or brokerage firm. 18 U.S.C.A. § 981(a)(l)(c) (West Supp. 1987). This is a marked
change from the Senate Judiciary bill.
86. 18 U.S.C.A. § 981(a)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
87. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 49.
88. 18 U.S.C.A. § 981(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1987).
89. As defined in the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West Supp. 1986).
90. If the offense had occurred in the U.S. The Act also removes the restriction to
financial transactions in the Senate Judiciary bill. S. 2683, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
91. 18 U.S.C.A. § 951(a)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
92. Id.§ 951(a)(1)(B).
93. Id.§ 981(e).
94. Id. § 981(i). This provision, along with id. § 981(a)(l)(b), implements in part article
18 of the treaty between the United States and Italy on mutual assistance in criminal matters.
Article 18 of that treaty provides that both countries are to have the authority to seize assets
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participating in any acts that lead to the seizure or forfeiture of such
95
property. The launderer's gross receipts must be criminally forfeited.
In contrast to the civil forfeiture provisions, the criminal forfeiture provisions are mandatory and the judge must order the forfeiture of the
property described above when imposing sentence on a convicted person.
II. Amendments to the Bank Secrecy Act
A. BACKGROUND

96
The Bank Records and Foreign Transaction Act (the Records Act)
was enacted into law on October 26, 1970. The Records Act requires

financial institutions 97 to make reports and keep records designed to iden-

tify the sources, volumes, and movements of United States currency being
transported into and out of the United States and being deposited in
financial institutions. The resulting audit trail is meant to be used by law
enforcement agencies in the detection and investigation of criminal
activities .98

Title I of the Records Act, Financial Recordkeeping, 99 requires financial
institutions to make and retain certain records. 100 Title II of the Records
found within their borders and to forfeit such assets for the benefit of the other country
based upon a violation of the other country's laws. The U.S. Senate advised and consented
to the ratification of this treaty on June 18, 1984. Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters, June 18, 1984, United States-Italy. See Megozzi, The 1982 Mutual
Assistance Treaty, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 813 (1986); see also Treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019,
T.I.A.S. No. 8302.
95. 18 U.S.C.A. § 982(a) (West Supp. 1987). The forfeiture of substitute assets is a
controversial provision, which threatens a defendant's right to counsel (see NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 2, 1987, at 3 (reluctance of attorneys to take Carlos Lehder Rivas's case); Note,
Attorney Fee Forfeiture, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1986)), though it is not intended to do
so. See 132 CONG. REC. H9472 (Oct. 8, 1986) (remarks of Mr. Edwards); HOUSE JUDICIARY
REPORT, supra note 6, at 14 (bona fide attorneys' fees).
96. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970). For legislative history, see 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4394.
97. And sometimes individuals. See infra text accompanying note 46.
98. The recordkeeping and reporting requirements are intended to reduce the use of
secret foreign bank accounts by white-collar criminals. Such accounts serve as the financial
underpinning of organized crime in the U.S. and are used by U.S. citizens and residents to
evade the payment of income taxes. 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4395.
Other purposes of the Records Act are to facilitate the supervision of financial institutions
properly subject to federal supervision, to aid duly constituted authorities and lawful investigations, and to provide for the collection of statistics necessary for the formulation of
monetary and economic policy. Id.
99. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970).
100. Some banks had limited or abolished the practice of photocopying checks, drafts,
and similar instruments, thus frustrating law enforcement. Identification of bank employees
or officers who actually dealt with accounts also could not be ascertained. A subpoena
might produce only a record of the activity in an account without anything more.
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Records Act, the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act,' 01
commonly known as the Bank Secrecy Act, requires individuals and financial institutions to report to the federal government certain foreign
and domestic financial transactions. Failure to make the required reports
0 3 and civil forfeiture.1 04
can lead to criminal' 0 2 and civil penalties,
The Department of the Treasury has promulgated regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy Act. These regulations require three kinds of
reports. First, a Currency Transaction Report (CTR) must be filed by
financial institutions on all currency transactions exceeding $10,000.105
Second, a Report of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments (CMIR) must be filed by institutions and individuals
when moving over $10,000 in currency or monetary instruments into or
out of the United States. 106 Third, a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial
Accounts (FBAR) 10 7 must be filed annually by individuals who have a
financial interest in or signature authority over bank accounts, securities
accounts, or other financial accounts in a foreign country.
As a general matter, the amendments by the Act enhance enforcement
provisions at little cost to the financial privacy of the individuals involved.
The amendments prohibiting evasive structuring and attempted unreported transportation significantly strengthen the capability of law enforcement without interfering with legitimate transactions. The amendments
to the change in control statutes, on the other hand, may interfere with
legitimate acquisitions of control with few enforcement gains.

101. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 201, 84 Stat. 1114, (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1305.

CODE CONG.

102. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5322 (West Supp. 1986).
103. Id. § 5321.
104. Id. § 5317; see infra note 161.

105. A CTR is required to be filed by financial institutions for each deposit, withdrawal,
exchange of currency, or other payment or transfer by, through, or to such financial institution that involves a transaction in currency of more than $10,000. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22
(1986); 31 U.S.C.A. § 5315 (West Supp. 1986).
The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 146(a), 98 Stat. 685, added new Code
§ 60501 requiring individuals to report cash in excess of $10,000 received in a trade or
business. I.R.C. § 60501 (1987). See 51 Fed. Reg. 31610 (1986) (implementing regulations).
Initially, information on capital flows was collected under § 5(b) of the Trading With the
Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 5(b) (West Supp. 1986) and § 8 of the Bretton Woods
Agreement Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 286f (West Supp. 1986).
106. 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 (1986); 31 U.S.C.A. § 5316 (West Supp. 1986).
107. The FBAR is required of individuals who have a financial interest in or signature
authority over bank accounts, securities accounts, or other financial accounts in a foreign
country. 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (1986). Chapter 4 authorizes recordkeeping and reporting requirements with respect to relationships and transactions with foreign financial agencies.
See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5314 (West Supp. 1986).
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TRANSACTIONS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

1. Prohibition of Evasive Structuring
Prior to the Act, federal courts were split on whether the Bank Secrecy
Act was violated when an individual structured currency transactions to
prevent a financial institution from reporting the transactions, thus circumventing the purpose of the reporting provision. 108 In some federal
circuits money launderers were successfully prosecuted for such structured transactions under federal statutes imposing derivative liability, such
as aiding and abetting or causing another to commit an offense, 10 9 or
concealing from the government a material fact by a trick, scheme, or
device."10 Other circuits, however, had held that structuring currency
transactions to avoid the reporting requirements did not violate the concealment statute because the reporting duties were placed solely on financial institutions, and therefore only financial institutions could directly
violate the reporting requirements. I i1

108. Either by causing financial institutions not to file reports on multiple currency transactions totaling more than $10,000 or by causing financial institutions to file incorrect reports.
109. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1986).
110. Id. § 1001. The concealment statute is designed "to protect the authorized functions
of governmental departments and agencies from the perversion which might result from the
deceptive practices described." United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941). See also
Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L. J. 405 (1959).
Other charges include 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (West Supp. 1986) for conspiracy to conceal
and for concealing material facts in a matter within the jurisdiction of the Internal Revenue
Service, id. § 1343 for wire fraud, and id. § 1951, the Hobbs Act.
In United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (1lth Cir. 1983), the Eleventh Circuit
upheld a conviction under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (with support from 18 U.S.C.A. § 2(b) to
substitute knowingly and willfully element for element of legal duty, see United States v.
McClanahan, 230 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956)). In Tobon-Builes,
the defendant concealed the existence, source, and transfer of over $100,000 by purchasing
cashier's checks in amounts less than $10,000 from several financial institutions. The court
held that the defendant was not explicitly required to report any transaction in currency
(though the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized under 31 U.S.C.A. § 1082 to require
both private individuals and financial institutions to file currency reports, at the time of the
case the Secretary only required such reports from financial institutions, 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)
(1983)). Nevertheless, the transactions were within the ambit of the reporting requirements
imposed on financial institutions, and therefore the transactions represented a knowing and
willful scheme to prevent the financial institutions from fulfilling their legal duty to file
reports for these transactions, in violation of the federal statute prohibiting concealment
from the government, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001. See also United States v. Heinemann, 801 F.2d
86 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Giancola, 783 F.2d 1549 (1Ith Cir. 1986); United States
v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 645 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1985); United States
v. Thompson, 603 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Sanchez Vazquez, 585 F. Supp.
990, 993 (N.D. Ga. 1984); United States v. Konefal, 566 F. Supp. 698 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
Ill. E.g., United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Denemark,
779 F.2d 1559 (1Ith Cir. 1986); United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676 (Ist Cir. 1985).
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The Act amends the Bank Secrecy Act to codify the former line of
cases and negate the latter' 12 by expressly subjecting to potential liability
a person who causes or attempts to cause a domestic financial institution
to fail to file a required report'

13

or who causes a domestic financial

institution to file a required report that contains a material omission or
misstatement of fact.' 14 In addition, the amendment creates the offense
of structuring, or assisting in structuring, or attempting to structure or to
assist in structuring a transaction for the purpose of evading the reporting
requirements, without regard to whether an individual transaction is, itself, reportable under the Bank Secrecy Act. 115 The creation of this new
offense is a powerful new enforcement weapon, but the breadth of its
definition threatens many legitimate transactions.
The Secretary of the Treasury may impose a civil money penalty on
any person who willfully violates the structured transaction prohibition. 116
The penalty may not exceed the amount of coins or currency or other
monetary instruments involved in the transaction. 117 The civil money
penalty is to be reduced by the amount of any forfeiture to the United
States under section 5317(d).118
2. Bank Secrecy Act Attempt Provisions

Prior to amendment, the Bank Secrecy Act did not require a financial
institution to report a currency transaction until fifteen days after the
transaction had taken place, thus impairing the investigation and prosecution of structured laundering transactions.

119

The Act adds attempt

112. The effective date of this amendment was January 27, 1987. Act § 1364(a). It applies
to transactions for the payment, receipt, or transfer of United States coins or currency or
other monetary instruments completed after this date. Id.; see United States v. Shearson
Lehman Brothers, 650 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (transitional rule).
113. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324(l) (West Supp. 1987).
114. Id. § 5324(2).
115. Id. § 5324(3). SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 48. For example, a person
who converts $18,000 in currency to cashiers checks by purchasing two $9,000 cashiers
checks at two different banks or on two different days with the specific intent that the
participating bank or banks not be required to file currency transaction reports for those
transactions, would be subject to potential civil and criminal liability. A person conducting
the same transactions for any other reason or persons splitting up an amount of currency
that would not be reportable if the full amount were involved in a single transaction (for
example, splitting $2,000 in currency into four transactions of $500 each), would not be
subject to liability under this section.
116. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5321(a)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
117. Id. § 5321(a)(4)(B).
118. Id. § 5321(a)(4)(C).
119. Reporting violations would not occur unless the financial institution failed to file the
report following the expiration of 15 days from the time of the transaction. As a result,
prosecutions of persons who structured their transactions to avoid the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act were impeded when, after 15 days, the money launderers
had fled or the investigative trail had grown stale.
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provisions that permit the rapid implementation of procedures for seizure
and forfeiture of funds. These provisions permit pursuit of violations from
transaction reporting requirements at the time of their attempt rather than
20
fifteen days later.1
3. Exemptions
Existing section 5318 of the Bank Secrecy Act authorizes the Secretary
of the Treasury to delegate compliance authority, 12 1 regulate compliance
procedures, and prescribe exemptions from the requirements of the Bank
Secrecy Act. The exemption authority granted by this section was designed to reduce unnecessary reports from retail enterprises, such as
grocery stores, that deal directly with consumers and normally generate
large volumes of cash. 122 New section 5318(f) provides that no person
may qualify for an exemption unless the relevant financial institution

prepares and maintains a statement that describes in detail the reasons
why such person is qualified for such exemption and such statement is
123
signed by. the person seeking exemption.
C.

IMPORTS AND ExPORTS OF CURRENCY AND MONETARY
INSTRUMENTS

124
of
Existing section 5316 of the Bank Secrecy Act requires reports
transportation of currency or its equivalent into or out of the United
States 125 by any person in an amount exceeding $10,000 "at one time."

120. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324 (West Supp. 1987). On March 18, 1987, the Internal Revenue
Service opened a regulation project concerning property seized under the Act. See Report
on Status of Regulations Projects as of March 31, 1987, 75 DAILY EXEC. REP. S-6 (Apr.
21, 1987).
121. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(a) (West Supp. 1986); see United States v. Deak-Perera & Co.,
566 F. Supp. 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
122. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318 (West Supp. 1986).
123. Act § 1356(b). For regulations issued under this section, see 51 Fed. Reg. 45108
(West Supp. 1986); 52 Fed. Reg. 11436 (West Supp. 1987).
124. If a report is required under § 5316 and is not filed or contains a material omission
or misstatement of fact, the instrument and any interest in property traceable to that instrument may be seized and forfeited to the United States. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5317(c) (West
Supp. 1987). The civil penalties are reduced by the amount forfeited. Id. § 5321. The
amendments are effective January 27, 1987, Act § 1364(b), as is Act § 1357(a). See supra
note 112.
125. Section 1362(b) of the Act amends the definition of "United States" in 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 5312(a)(5) (West Supp. 1987). Prior to amendment, the definition referred to "territories
and possessions" of the United States, The amended definition includes the territories,
possessions, and the trust territory of the Pacific Islands.
If pending legislation is enacted to change the status of the divisions of the trust territory
of the Pacific Islands, this provision may no longer pertain to those jurisdictions. Laws
enacted pursuant to the United States, authority as trustee will no longer be applicable to
divisions of the trust territory other than the northern Mariana Islands. SENATE JUDICIARY
REPORT,

supra note 6, at 47.
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The Act grants the Secretary of the Treasury authority to issue regulations
to define "at one time" and to require the cumulation of closely related
events for purposes of the reporting requirements. 126 Section 5316 is also
modified by requiring a report when one is about to transport a monetary
instrument, rather than when one attempts transportation. 127 This broadens the scope of the reporting requirement to allow earlier apprehension
of offenders before they leave the United States. 128 Customs officers may
stop and search at the border without a search warrant any vehicle, container, or person entering or departing the United States to assure
29
compliance. 1
D.

BANK SECRECY ACT ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS

1.Penalties

Amendments to the Bank Secrecy Act enhance the criminal penalty for
violations of the Act occurring in conjunction with violations of other
laws of the United States, or with other illegal activity involving more
than $100,000, when the two violations occur within a twelve-month period. 130 The amendments increase the maximum term of imprisonment
from five to ten years.

13 1

The Act also expands the civil penalties available for violations of the
Bank Secrecy Act. New or increased penalties are available for negligent
violations of the recordkeeping and reporting requirements,' 32 willful re126. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to prescribe regulations defining the
term "at one time." 31 U.S.C.A. § 5316(d) (West Supp. 1987). See 52 Fed. Reg. 11436 (West
Supp. 1987) (reporting of multiple, same-day currency transactions of which financial institutions are aware total more than $10,000).
127. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5316(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
128. See 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3482 (legislative history of amendment

adding attempt provision).
129. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5317(b) (West Supp. 1987); see United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d
279 (10th Cir. 1978).
130. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5322(b) (West Supp. 1987).
131. Act § 1357(g)(2). The language is also amended to correct the interpretation problem
that arose in the case of United States v. Dickenson, 706 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1983), in which
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the requirement of other illegal activities in
excess of $100,000 referred only to reporting violations under the Bank Secrecy Act. The
amended section is designed to make explicit that illegal activities involving more than
$100,000 are not restricted to violations under the Bank Secrecy Act itself, but may include
any illegal activity involving the requisite amount. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, Supra note

6, at 46. The term "illegal activities" means activities constituting an offense whether or
not the person has been charged or convicted of the offense. Id.
132. Act § 1357(d). The Secretary of the Treasury may impose a civil money penalty of
not more than $500 on any financial institution that negligently violates the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act. Prior to amendment, sanctions existed only for willful
violations. The amendments reflect congressional concern that negligent nonfiling by banks
deprived the government of important law enforcement information. SENATE JUDICIARY
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porting violations, 133 and willful violations of the foreign financial agency
transaction prohibitions. 134 The amendments extend the statute of limitations for assessment of civil penalties under the Bank Secrecy Act from
five years 135 to six years.

136

Criminal penalties

137

and civil penalties 138

139
imposed with respect to the same violation are cumulative.

2. Treasury's Compliance Authority

The ordinary money laundering case involves two primary jurisdictional
issues: whether the United States has jurisdiction to compel a summons
or subpoena duces tecum, and whether the United States has jurisdiction
to attach criminal liability to the suspect conduct. The Act amendments

REPORT, supra note 6, at 45. The committee indicated that it did not intend to apply the
sanction to occasional clerical errors. The penalty is imposed per violation, and not each
day a violation continues. Id. at 46.
133. Prior to amendment, the civil penalty for willful violations of the Bank Secrecy Act
reporting requirements was $10,000 per violation, with an additional penalty for international
transaction reporting violations. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5321 (West Supp. 1986). Effective October
27, 1986, the Act increases the amount of the penalty for financial institutions to the greater
of the amount of the transaction up to $100,000, or $25,000 for all willful reporting violations.
31 U.S.C.A. § 5321(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
134. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5314 (West Supp. 1985). These violations relate to records and reports
of foreign financial agency accounts and transactions. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5321(a)(5) (West Supp.
1987); see 52 Fed. Reg. 11436 (1987) (correcting civil penalty that can be assessed for willful
violations of recordkeeping requirements). The penalty for violations involving transactions
is limited to the greater of the amount of the transaction, not exceeding $100,000, or $25,000,
31 U.S.C.A. § 5321(a)(5)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1987), and in the case of a violation involving
failure to report the existence of an account or any identifying information required to be
provided, the civil penalty is limited to the greater of an amount equal to the balance in the
account at the time of the violation not exceeding $100,000, or $25,000. Id. § 532 I(a)(5)(B)(ii).
135. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2462 (West Supp. 1987).
136. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5321(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987). The Senate Judiciary Committee believed that the change was needed because many civil penalty cases have corresponding
criminal actions, which take many months to conclude. Because it was not unusual for civil
proceedings to be stayed pending the resolutions of the criminal proceedings, or for the
Department to delay its decision to assess the civil penalty until the conclusion of the
criminal proceedings, many civil proceedings were not assessed within the period of limitations. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 46. In addition to the general six-year
limitation period, the Secretary may bring an action to recover an assessed civil penalty at
any time before the end of the two-year period beginning on the later of the penalty's
assessment or the conclusion of a criminal action under 31 U.S.C.A. § 5322 (West Supp.
1987). Id. § 5321(b)(2).
137. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5322 (West Supp. 1986).
138. Id.§ 5321.
139. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5321(d) (West Supp. 1987). If the Secretary of the Treasury assesses
a civil penalty in a case and then refers the case to the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution, a court should decide whether or not to impose criminal penalties without
regard to whether a civil penalty previously has been imposed. Likewise, if a criminal
conviction preceded the assessment of a civil penalty, the Secretary of the Treasury is free
to impose the full measure of civil penalties available without regard to any criminal sanction
imposed. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 46.
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to the Bank Secrecy Act address the first question by granting the Secretary of the Treasury expansive new authority to summon both testimonial and documentary evidence. 140 The new summons authority 141 may
be used against any financial institution, whether foreign or domestic,
42
regulated by the Treasury Department.1
The issuance of a subpoena to the U.S. branch of a predominantly
offshore financial institution to obtain records of foreign financial activity
has been a source of considerable controversy. Compliance with such a
subpoena may force the institution to violate strict secrecy and blocking
laws of other nations from which records may be sought. 14 3 United States
courts are split on the application of extraterritorial jurisdiction to subpoenas. One line of cases, culminating in United States v. Bank of Nova
140. Before amendment, compliance by financial institutions with the Bank Secrecy Act
was monitored by the Internal Revenue Service. The Treasury Department is assigned
overall responsibility for implementing the Bank Secrecy Act. See Vetco, 81-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 9428 (I.R.S. summons); Olsen, Discovery in Federal Criminal Investigations,
16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 999 (1984).
The Internal Revenue Service was forced to rely on voluntary cooperation of these
institutions to ensure compliance, since the Internal Revenue Service's summons authority
does not extend beyond tax matters. See I.R.C. § 7602 (1986) (examination of books and
witnesses); Id. § 982 (admissibility of documentation maintained in foreign countries).
141. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(a)(4) (West Supp. 1987).
142. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 43.

143. The Bahamas and the Cayman Islands have such strict secrecy laws. See CRIMINAL
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION
LAUNDERING: A GUIDE TO THE BANK SECRECY ACT 3 (1983).
DIVISION,

OF ILLEGAL MONEY

Secrecy laws are confidentiality laws that protect private interests in bank records, such
as the identity of a bank customer. They generally may be waived with the express or implied
consent of the customer. Honegger, Demystification of the Swiss Bank Secrecy and Illumination of the United States-Swiss Memorandum of Understanding, 9 N.C. J. INT'L L.
& COMM. REG. 1 (1983).
Blocking laws generally embody the national interest in prohibiting the disclosure, copying, inspection, or removal of documents located in the territory of the enacting state in
compliance with orders of foreign authorities. They cannot be waived by private parties
because they protect national rather than private interests.
The area is of concern to the Securities and Exchange Commission in policing internationalized U.S. capital markets. See 49 Fed. Reg. 31300 (1984); Auber, The Limits of Swiss
Banking Secrecy Under Domestic and International Law, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 273
(1984); Elinger, Aspects of Bank Secrecy, 1985 J. Bus. L. 439; Hurd, Insider Trading and
Foreign Bank Secrecy, 24 AM. Bus. L.J. 25 (1986); Navickas, 2 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAW.

159 (1984); Nelson, Insider Trading and Waiver by Conduct, 19 INT'L LAW. 817 (1985);
Weiland, The Use of Offshore Institutions to Facilitate Criminal Activity in the U.S. and
the Concomitant Problems Posed to Law Enforcement Personnel in Obtaining Pre-indictment and Pre-Trial Disclosure, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1115 (1984); Comment, Piercing
Offshore Bank Secrecy Laws Used to Launder Illegal Narcotic Profits: The Cayman Islands
Example, 2 TEX. INT'L L.J. 133 (1985); Note, The Effect of Swiss Bank Secrecy on the
Enforcement of Insider Trading and the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United
States and Switzerland, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 541 (1984); Note, Offshore Financial
Centers in the Caribbean Basin and Secrecy Jurisdictions: Current Trends and Developments
in U.S. Anti-Tax Haven Policy, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L COMP. L. 520 (1986); Note, S.E.C.

Waiver by Conduct Proposal: A Critical Appraisal, 71 VA. L. REV. 1411 (1985).
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Scotia, 144 calls for an expansive application of U.S. law to all persons
deemed present or having contacts within the United States. The minority
line of cases, led by United States v. First National Bank,145 is more

deferential to foreign sovereignty.
Because of the importance of the grand jury in the investigation of
possible criminal violations, courts generally hold that restrictions upon
a grand jury's investigative powers should be held to a minimum. 146 Moreover, as the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, "[c]ourts tradi-

tionally give wide latitude in determining relevancy in the context of an
administrative subpoena." 147 Thus the expanded authority increases the
potential for conflicts with other nations. 148 The Senate Judiciary Com144. In Re Grand July Proceedings of the Bank of Nova Scotia (Nova Scotia I1), 740
F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984). See also Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 691 F.2d 1384
(Ilth Cir. 1982). Bank of Nova Scotia is primarily significant because it established the role
of the courts in enforcing grand jury subpoenas duces tecam. Bank of Nova Scotia declined
to impose restrictions on the grand jury investigative process on the grounds that federal
courts should not impinge on the political prerogatives of the government in foreign relations.
The court held this notwithstanding that compliance with the summons would require the
Bank of Nova Scotia to violate Bahamian and Cayman Island bank secrecy laws. This
conflict of concurrent jurisdiction was resolved in Nova Scotia !i,740 F.2d 817 (11 th Cir.
1984), by balancing the interest of the United States in upholding the grand jury subpoena
against the interest of the Cayman Islands in bank secrecy, as recommended by § 40 of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND).

See Houck, Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the

United States (Revised): Issues and Resolutions, 20 INT'L LAW. 1361 (1986). Thus, both
Bank of Nova Scotia and Nova Scotia II illustrate the reluctance of the judiciary to impose
limits on extraterritorial grand jury subpoenas.
145. 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983). First National Bank utilizes the same balancing test as
Bank of Nova Scotia, but reaches an opposite conclusion. First National Bank weighed the
competing interests of the United States and of Greece and declined to grant enforcement
of an Internal Revenue Service summons. The court distinguished Bank of Nova Scotia by
noting that in Bank of Nova Scotia the information was sought by a grand jury conducting
tax and narcotics investigations, so that the interest of the United States in the grand jury
process of investigation and enforcement of its criminal laws was involved, in addition to
the United States interests identified in First National Bank.
146. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404, 407 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976). Thus, absent a strong showing of illegality or
impropriety, grand jury subpoenas duces tecum will be afforded great deference by United
States courts. Each decision is strictly limited to the attendant facts and circumstances,
however. For example, Bank of Nova Scotia does not hold that all banking activity or
operations of the Bank of Nova Scotia are subject to the jurisdiction of a federal grand jury
or a federal court. 691 F.2d at 1388.
147. United States v. O'Neill, 619 F.2d 222, 228 (3d Cir. 1980). Underjudicial formulations
ofrelevancy standards, a summons issued under this authority would be valid "if the inquiry
is within the authority of the agency, the demand not too indefinite, and the information
sought is reasonably relevant." United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
Administrative bodies like the Treasury Department are not limited to the more stringent
relevancy standard applied in judicial tribunals in seeking information to discharge their
duties properly. Id.at 642; see, e.g. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964).
148. In determining the relevance of a summons request, courts apply the same general
standard used in determining the validity of administrative subpoenas. 31 U.S.C.A. §
5318(a)(3)(4) (West Supp. 1987). A summons may direct production of "such books, papers,
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mittee intended that such conflicts between U.S. law enforcement interests and foreign secrecy and blocking laws should first be approached
through diplomatic efforts, then by the balancing of competing interests
as courts have done in the Nova Scotia cases.

149

International conflicts are also sought to be avoided by limiting the new
summons power of the Secretary of the Treasury to civil enforcement of
the Bank Secrecy Act,1 50 by limiting issuance authority to the Secretary
of the Treasury or "a supervisory level delegate,"'' 5 and by providing
that a summons may not require that documents requested be produced
in a place more than 500 miles distant from any place where the financial
52
institution operates or conducts business in the United States.
3. Supervisory Compliance Authority

The Act charges banking regulatory agencies with expanding their supervision of the recordkeeping systems of the financial institutions they
oversee. Agencies are required to prescribe regulations requiring the financial institutions they regulate to establish and maintain procedures

reasonably designed to assure and monitor compliance with the Bank
Secrecy Act. 153 The agencies are also required to review such procedures

records or other data," and provide for testimony under oath, "as may be relevant or
material" to an investigation for civil enforcement of the Bank Secrecy Act. Id.; Act
§ 1356(a)(6).
149. 691 F.2d 1384 (1lth Cir. 1982). See Commentary, Bank of Nova Scotia II: The
American Subpoena and the Multinational Enterprise, 19 CANADIAN Bus. L.J. 497 (1984);
Olsen, Discovery in Federal Criminal Investigations, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 999
(1984). Nova Scotia Ii, 740 F.2d 817 (1Ilth Cir. 1984); see also United States v. First National
Bank, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983); Garpeg, Ltd. v. United States. 583 F. Supp. 799 (D.C.N.Y.
1984).
150. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987).This limitation to civil enforcement is
not intended to be read as a restriction on using information developed from a civil summons
in any criminal investigation or proceeding relating to the Bank Secrecy Act or any other
matter. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 44. The Committee intended that
procedures that Treasury currently uses to convey information with respect to corresponding
civil and criminal Bank Secrecy Act cases will not be affected.
151. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987). The Senate Judiciary Report expresses
the Committee's intention that the delegation authority will not extend to persons with levels
of responsibility less than those currently exercised by the District Chief, Examination
Division, or District Chief, Criminal Investigation Division, of the Internal Revenue Service.
SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 44. This delegated summons authority includes
not only the authority to issue summons, but also the authority to administer oaths and
affirmations, receive evidence, and examine witnesses pursuant to the summons.
152. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(c)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
153. Act § 1359. A General Accounting Office report found that compliance examinations
of financial institutions do not detect serious violations and that the Treasury Department needs
more information about compliance examination efforts. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
BANK SECRECY ACT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS HAVE NOT YET MET EXPECTATIONS, SUGGESTING NEED FOR AMENDMENT (1981); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK
SECRECY ACT: FINANCIAL INSTITUTION REGULATORS' COMPLIANCE EXAMINATIONS (1986).
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during the course of their examinations. 154 The Act authorizes agencies
to issue civil money penalties and cease and desist orders in the event
that a financial institution fails to establish such procedures or to correct
problems with regard to its procedures after an agency has notified the
institution that problems exist. 155 Initial regulations require that a financial
institution's compliance program must, at minimum, consist of a system
of internal controls to assure ongoing compliance and provide for independent testing of compliance by the institution's personnel or by an
outside person.1 56 The financial institutions must also designate an individual responsible for coordinating and monitoring day-to-day compliance
57
and provide training for appropriate personnel. 1
The Act amends provisions relating to supervisory compliance of two
other federal Acts, the Change in Bank Control Act 158 and the Change
in Savings and Loan Control Act. 159 The Acts authorize banking agencies
to disapprove changes of control of financial institutions within their jurisdictions. The acts are designed to prevent dishonest persons, especially
those with a prior history of insider abuse or those who may have a
160
criminal background, from gaining control of financial institutions.
Amendments to the Change in Bank Control Act and the Change in Savings and Loan Control Act require banking regulatory agencies to conduct
investigations of persons proposing to acquire control of financial insti-

154. Act § 1359.
155. Id.
156. 52 Fed. Reg. 2858 (1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 3207 (1987) (procedures for monitoring Bank
Secrecy Act compliance).
157. Id.
158. Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
159. Id., passed as titles 6 and 7 of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest
Rate Control Act of 1978.
160. HousE BANKING REPORT, supra note 40, at 43. In 1984 the House Committee on

Government Operations issued a report that was highly critical of the regulatory agencies'
handling of applications under the change in control acts. HOUSE COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS,

FEDERAL

RESPONSE

TO

CRIMINAL

MISCONDUCT

AND

INSIDER

ABUSE

IN

THE

NATION'S FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1984). The report found that the "banking agencies
generally fail to investigate or verify information furnished by applicants under the Change
in Bank Control Act or the Change in Savings and Loan Control Act. Consequently, persons
lacking in integrity, experience, and financial ability-and even persons with criminal records-have acquired control of financial institutions." The report further stated that the
agencies rarely disapprove applications unless an applicant is a convicted felon, even if
other adverse information is uncovered.
Concerned by the Government Operations Committee's findings, the House Banking
Committee proposed several modifications to the Change in Bank Control Act. It was
particularly troubled by the possibility that organized criminals or drug traffickers might
acquire a financial institution and use it for unlimited money laundering operations. HOUSE
BANKING REPORT, supra note 40, at 43.
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tutions. 16 1 Amendments also require the federal banking agencies to publish the name of the institution proposed to be acquired and the identity
of the proposed acquirer within a reasonable period of time after receipt
of the notice of a proposed acquisition. 162 A specific exemption to the
publication requirement is created for situations in which the safety and
163
soundness of the institution is threatened.
The Act also requires the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
with the Federal Reserve Board, to initiate discussions with central banks
or other appropriate government officials of other countries, in order that
an information exchange system may be established to assist participating
countries in their efforts to eliminate the international flow of money
derived from illicit drug operations and other criminal activities.164 The
House Banking Committee report urges the Federal Reserve to use its
membership on the Basle Committee to encourage these efforts. 165 The
Secretary of the Treasury is required to report the results of its efforts
to the House and Senate Banking Committees. 166
The Act also requires the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to conduct
a study of money laundering through foreign branches of domestic financial institutions. 167

161. Act § 1360(b) (change in bank control); Act § 1361(b) (change in savings and loan
control). The agencies are also required to verify independently the accuracy and completeness of the information contained in a notice of proposed acquisition, at least to the
extent that such information is relevant to determination of a person's competence, experience, integrity, and financial ability. In making this verification, it is expected that the
agencies will be guided by a "reasonableness standard." HOUSE BANKING REPORT, supra
note 40, at 43. Further, the agencies are required to prepare written reports containing a
summary of the results of each investigation and maintain that report as a record of the
agency.
162. HoUsE BANKING REPORT, supra note 40, at 43. The agencies are directed to solicit
public comment, particularly from persons in the geographic area where the financial institution proposed to be acquired is located. The publication must occur within a "reasonable" time after receipt of the notice to ensure that sufficient time is allowed for meaningful
public comment before expiration of the notice review period.
163. Id. That exception is considered broad enough to encompass emergency acquisitions
or infusions of capital.
164. Act § 1363(a); see Crinon, Information Gathering on Tax Evasion in Tax Haven
Countries, 20 INT'L LAW. 1209 (1986).
165. HOUSE BANKING REPORT, supra note 40, at 43. The Basle Committee, also known
as the Cooke Committee, is an unofficial arm of the Bank for International Settlements.
Since the Committee's inception in 1974, it has become the premier forum for improvement
and cooperation in international banking regulation. See Friesen, The Regulation and Supervision of International Lending, 20 INT'L LAW. 153 (1986).
166. Act § 1363(b).
167. Id. § 1363(c).
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III. Amendments to the Right to Financial Privacy Act
A.

BACKGROUND

The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (RFPA) 168 was enacted to
restore the balance between an individual's right to privacy and the ex-

igencies of law enforcement. In restrictive interpretations of the fourth
amendment in Schultz

69

and United States v. Miller,170 the Supreme

Court failed to recognize that individuals have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in financial records even though the records are not owned or

possessed by the individual.
The RFPA provides, with a number of very important exceptions, that

where the United States government requires a financial institution to
provide information relating to its customers' financial records, the government must first obtain a subpoena, search warrant, or other appropriate
authorization, comply with certain prior notice requirements, 17 1 and certify to the financial institution that it has complied with the provisions of

168. Title XI of the Financial Institution Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 9305 (codified in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.); see 31 C.F.R. § 14 (1986) (implementing regulations).
169. See supra note 9.
170. 425 U.S. 435 (1976); see Banking Decisions, 93 BANKING L.J. 838 (1976). United
States v. Miller was decided two years after Schultz. In Miller the defendant bank customer
had petitioned unsuccessfully to suppress production of copies of checks and other bank
records obtained pursuant to allegedly defective subpoenas served on the presidents of two
banks where the defendant maintained accounts. The subpoenas were allegedly defective
because they were issued by a United States attorney rather than by a court, no return was
made to a court, and the subpoenas were returnable prior to the time of the meeting of the
grand jury investigating the charges. In sum, the bank records had been requested, obtained,
and used for investigative purposes solely on the initiative of the enforcement officials and
without any judicial supervision. Miller, 425 U.S. at 440. The banks kept the records in
compliance with the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act. Without giving notice of the
subpoenas to the defendant, the banks ordered their employees to make the records available
to the federal agents for inspection and reproduction.
The Supreme Court held that the defendant had no protectible fourth amendment interest
in the subpoenaed documents. The Supreme Court reasoned that the documents subpoenaed
were owned and possessed by the banks, not the customer. Although the customer may
have been a party to the transactions reflected by the documents, the bank was also a party.
The Court held that the Bank Secrecy Act does not, by virtue of requiring banks to keep
records that the customer might himself otherwise keep and allowing law enforcement
officials access thereto in accordance with legal process, expand the concept ofa protectible
fourth amendment interest beyond traditional notions of ownership and possession. The
Court reasoned that, though precedent exists for so expanding that concept, expansion is
justified only where there is a "legitimate expectation of privacy." Miller at 442 (quoting
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973)).
171. Notice may be delayed when it would endanger any person, result in the destruction
of evidence, or jeopardize the investigation. Agencies are required to follow the procedures
of the RFPA when they seek an individual's records.
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the RFPA. If the government fails to fulfill any of these requirements, the
financial institution is prohibited from complying with its request for
disclosure. 172
The exceptions to the application of the RFPA provide that the RFPA
does not apply to records not identified with particular customers, to
records required pursuant to the exercise of supervisory or regulatory
authority, or to various other classes of records, including those requested
by subpoena or court order issued in connection with proceedings before
a grand jury. 173 Records of corporations are not protected, as corporations
174
are deemed not to have privacy rights.
B.

AMENDMENTS TO THE RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT

Section 1353 of the Act is designed to correct particular problems with
the RFPA that have arisen in money laundering investigations. First, the
amendments make clear that suspected violations of laws may be reported, and lists three items of information that may be disclosed without
fear of private suits. Second, the amendments clarify particular circumstances under which notice to the customer is not required or may be
delayed.
1.Reporting Suspected Violations

Even prior to amendment, the RFPA did not preclude a financial institution from notifying authorities that it "has information which may be
relevant to a possible violation of any statute or regulation." 75 Moreover,
172. 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 9278.
173. One of the most controversial features of the RFPA is the provision that permits
governmental access to financial records upon the submission of a formal written request,
that must meet certain requirements, by the investigating authorities. Some view this as a
broadening rather than a limiting of the government's investigatory powers, because they
read this provision as being an effective grant of an administrative subpoena power to those
government agencies that do not otherwise have such powers. Others seem to feel that the
statute is not intended to create such a power and that a financial institution that merely
receives such a request is under no obligation to comply.
174. The RFPA protects only "persons," defined to mean an individual or a partnership
of five or fewer individuals. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3401(4) (West Supp. 1985).
175. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3403(c) (West Supp. 1987). The provision does not authorize wholesale
disclosure of financial records, but the financial institution must be able to give a government
authority enough information about the nature of the possible violation and parties involved
in order for that authority to proceed with the summons, subpoena, or search warrant for
additional information. The RFPA provides protection for the financial institution that does
respond to a request for information in § I110(e) and further in § 1117(c). The Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 West Supp. 1986; Peet, Bank Secrecy, Financial Privacy
and Related Restrictions, 7 INT'L Bus. LAW. 259, 284 (1979). The RFPA does not impose
restrictions on the information required by Criminal Referral Forms. See 51 Fed. Reg. 25866,
25869 (West Supp. 1986).
The legislative history of the RFPA indicates that under this provision "a bank could,
and should, report to appropriate officials information pertaining to the cashing of a forged
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section 1I 13(d) 176 states that nothing in the RFPA authorizes withholding

"information required to be reported in accordance with any federal statute or rule promulgated thereunder."' 177 Once the government authority
has received such a notification, it is required to comply with the provisions of the RFPA with respect78to obtaining financial records and the
information contained in them. 1
Prior to the Act a great deal of confusion existed among financial institutions regarding how much information relating to the possible violation of law could be given to a government authority under existing
section 1 113(d) without notice to the affected customers. New section
1353(a) of the Act identifies three specific pieces of information that may
be released: the name or other identifying information concerning any
individual involved in the conduct of a suspect transaction, 179 any account

number or other identifying information concerning the account involved,
and the nature of any suspected illegal activity.1 80 Any disclosure is en-

check, the passing of counterfeit currency or bonds, or the use of its services to facilitate
a fraudulent scheme." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 218 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 9273, 9348. The office of the Comptroller of the

Currency is of the opinion that its regulations are in compliance with the RFPA. See 51
Fed. Reg. 25866, 25869 (West Supp. 1986).
176. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3413(d) (West Supp. 1987).
177. As clarification, H.R. REP. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 226, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 9273, 9356, provides that Congress intended this provision

to apply to such reports required under statutes as the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
178. 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 9322. See also Clayton Brokerage Co.

v. Clement, 87 F.R.D. 569 (D.C. Md. 1980) (discovery); Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 44
Md. App. 335, 408 A.2d 758 (1979) (expectation of confidentiality).
179. The institution may disclose the name of any corporate entity, partnership, or other
organization in which an account is listed, as well as the name of any individual involved
in a suspected transaction. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 41. Other identifying

information that may be disclosed about individuals includes the individual's home or business addresses or social security number. Identifying information about accounts includes,
in addition to the account number, the type of account (checking, savings, securities) or the
interest rate paid on the account. It also includes the location of the branch or office in
which the account is maintained. Id. See 51 Fed. Reg. 16485 (1986) (reports of apparent
crimes affecting FDIC insured nonmember banks); 12 C.F.R. § 21 (1986) (Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) minimum security devices and procedures); 12 C.F.R.
§ 326 (1986) (FDIC minimum security devices and procedures); 51 Fed. Reg. 25860 (1986)
(OCC rules for reports of crimes and suspected crimes).
180. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3404(c) (West Supp. 1987). The financial institution may specify the
offense that the financial institution believes is being perpetrated or provide a description
of the activities giving rise to the bank's suspicions. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra
note 6, at 41. Thus, for instance ifa customer ofa bank comes into the bank with regularity,
every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, to obtain a cashiers check with $5,000 in small
denomination bills, the bank could describe this pattern in the information it submits to law
enforcement officials, even if the bank does not know precisely what law might be violated.
id.
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tirely voluntary on the part of the disclosing bank. 181 The section preempts
state and local privacy laws to the extent that such laws prohibit voluntary
disclosure of the information specified above. 182
A limited "good faith defense" is provided for financial institutions that
provide voluntary disclosure. 18 3 The good faith defense protects officers,

employees, and agents of financial institutions, as well as financial institutions themselves, from liability for disclosure or for failure to notify the
customer of the disclosure.1 84 Under previously existing law, a financial
institution that in good faith relied on certification that the governmental
authority had complied with the applicable procedures of the RFPA was
immune from civil suit by the customer whose records have been disclosed. 185 This exemption extends to disclosure of the above three items. 186
2. Exemption From Notice to Customer

Grand jury subpoenas and related court orders are exempt from the
RFPA. 187 Despite clear legislative intent to the contrary, several courts
had refused government requests to order financial institutions to delay
181. The Senate Judiciary Committee encourages financial institutions to provide voluntary disclosure wherever they legitimately suspect illegal activity, consistent with the
privacy rights of their customers, and to establish a formal policy that encourages officers
and employees promptly to report illegal activity. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, SUPRA note
6, at 41.
182. Including, presumably, cases such as Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 44 Md. App.
335, 408 A.2d 758 (1979).
183. Act § 1353(a). Good faith compliance with a regulation is a legal defense against
civil suits for defamation where, for example, an individual named in a criminal referral
form as a subject is ultimately exonerated and initiates an action against the referring bank.
See Wilson v. Retail Credit Co., 438 F.2d 1043, 1045 (5th cir. 1971); W PROSSER & P. KEETON,
LAW OF TORTS § 115 (4th ed. 1984). Federal regulations promulgating in this regard probably
preempt inconsistent state laws. See 51 Fed. Reg. 25860, 25869 (West Supp. 1986).
184. All suits are precluded by this defense, including suits brought under any theory of
federal, state, or local law, common law as well as statutory, and suits brought under
constitutional provisions. SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 42.
185. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3417(c) (West Supp. 1985). Section 1117(c), 12 U.S.C.A. § 3417(c)
(West Supp. 1985), provides that a financial institution will not be liable for disclosures made
in good faith reliance upon a § 1103(b), 12 U.S.C.A. § 3403(b) (West Supp. 1985), certificate
provided by a government authority. Section 1103(b) provides that a financial institution
may not release financial records until the government authority seeking the records certifies
in writing that it has complied with the provisions of the title. Government employees who
submit false certificates may be subject to criminal prosecution or administrative sanctions.
186. Because no government certificate changes hands in the voluntary disclosure allowed
by § 1353(a) of the Act, however, the only way an institution can assure itself of protection
from civil suit is if it limits its disclosures to the above three items of information. SENATE
JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 6, at 42.
187. Act § 1353(b). This exemption was designed to avoid diminishing grand jury secrecy
due to expanded customer notice protections and challenge rights of the RFPA. The drafters
believed the grand jury to be the single most effective investigative tool in criminal law
enforcement. 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS'at 9358, 9376.
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notifying their customer of the receipt of a grand jury subpoena.1 88 The
Act reaffirms this legislative intent by authorizing a court to order a
financial institution not to notify the customer of the existence of a subpoena or of the fact that information has been furnished to a grand jury. 189
IV. Conclusion
Sophistication in criminal financial activity requires proportionately sophisticated enforcement mechanisms. Unless enforcement mechanisms
keep pace, the rule of law will be undermined. Enforcement mechanisms,
however, must not be allowed to invade the province of individual liberties. Perfect subordination of the law enforcement authority of the government to the fundamental rights of individuals directs the optimum
course for laws governing confidentiality and disclosure of financial
information.
Legislation reveals present policy choices, and when contrasted with
the past throws light on the future. Analysis of the Money Laundering
Control Act of 1986 reveals that an era of increasing disclosure of financial
information threatens us. Money laundering, because of its integration
with crimirl activity, ordinarily is not an activity that legitimately may
claim confidentiality. Boundaries between criminality and legitimacy are
constantly changing, however. Expanding conceptions of criminality may
jtustify further intrusions into the public's privacy. Criminal laws, however,
must respect the privacy of individuals or respect for the criminal laws
is lost. Knowledge by the state of all of the financial activities of an
individual preponderates the safe cession of information to the state.

188. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. GJ 31, 628 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Ark. 1986);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 575 F. Supp. 1219 (E.D. Pa. 1983). According to
the President's Commission on Organized Crime, supra note 6, the effect of these decisions
has been to jeopardize many significant organized crime investigations because financial
institutions that have received record subpoenas have proceeded to notify their customers
of the pendency of investigation against them.
189. Act § 1353(b). This amendment was adopted to address the problem in In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, No. GJ 31, 628 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Ark. 1986). The court ruled that it had
no authority under the RFPA, in the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1651 (West Supp. 1986),
or in the inherent powers of the court to issue an order that the receipt of a subpoena from
a grand jury be kept secret.
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